Abstract. Hu and Huang proposed an identity-based proxy signature scheme with bilinear pairings. By this approach, the extra burden of verifying a public key with a certificate can be eliminated, and the length of a digital signature can be 160 bits only. Later, Park et al. pointed out that Hu and Huang's scheme suffers from one serious problem, privacy problem, such that a proxy key is generated by using a designated proxy signer's private key without his agreement. To solve this problem, Park et al. also proposed an improvement. With deep insight into Park et al.'s improvement, two drawbacks are found. First, a designated proxy signer may be fooled. Second, the verification of the proxy key in Park et al.'s scheme will never succeed. To preserve advantages and overcome drawbacks, an enhancement will be proposed in this paper.
Introduction
Identity-based cryptosystem (IDC) was first introduced by Shamir in 1984 [19] . IDC provides a simple way to eliminate the extra burden of verifying a public key with a certificate. In IDC, there exists a trustworthy private key generator (PKG). Each user has to register his identity with PKG in advance. When a user's registration request is accepted, PKG will generate the user's private key according to his identity which is the corresponding public key. The benefit of identity-based cryptosystem is that a user's public key can be directly calculated by his identity instead of being extracted from a certificate issued by a certificate authority. Note that a user's private key is computed by a trustworthy party, PKG.
The concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo et al. in 1996 [16] . In a proxy signature scheme, there are three entities: an original signer, a proxy signer and a verifier. The original signer can delegate his signing capacity to a designated person who is called a proxy signer. The proxy signer can generate valid signatures on behalf of the original signer. A verifier can determine the original signer and the proxy signer by verification equations. Thus, a valid proxy signature is generated by a proxy signer, and the original signer cannot deny his delegation. That is, a proxy signature scheme must possess the essential security property: nonrepudiation. According to Mambo et al.'s statement [16] , delegation of proxy signatures can be classified into three types: full delegation, partial delegation and delegation with warrant. Among them, the third type is the most common one.
Thereupon, several types of proxy signature schemes have been proposed [1, 5-8, 12, 13, 20, 21] . Recently, Hu and Huang proposed an ID-based proxy signature scheme, Hu-Huang scheme, with bilinear pairings [10] . With bilinear pairings, the length of a digital signature can be 160 bits only [2, 3] . Short KWWSG[GRLRUJMLWF signature schemes possess a great advantage because the needed bandwidth is small. Because of the superior properties of IDS and bilinear pairings, various ID-based applications using bilinear pairings have been proposed [11, 14, 18, 22] . In Hu-Huang scheme, the proxy public key is computed from a warrant. However, Park et al. pointed out that HuHuang scheme suffers from one serious problem, privacy problem, such that PKG generates a proxy key by using a designated proxy signer's private key without his agreement [17] . To solve this problem, Park et al. also proposed an improvement. With deep insight into Park et al.'s scheme, some drawbacks are observed. First, a designated proxy signer cannot make sure whether the delegation request is indeed sent from the original signer indicated in the warrant. Thus, he may be fooled and execute some computation operations until the verification of the proxy key fails. Via fooling attack, only PKG knows who the real original signer is. If no auditing mechanism is employed, the malicious user will never be detected. Second, the verification of the proxy key in Park et al.'s scheme will never succeed.
To preserve its advantages and overcome its drawbacks, an enhancement will be proposed in this paper. Moreover, this enhancement should provide properties which a strong proxy signature scheme should provide. In 2001, Lee et al. [15] defined five properties that a strong proxy signature scheme should provide: (1) strong unforgeability, (2) verifiability, (3) strong identifiability, (4) strong undeniability, and (5) prevention of misuse. Except the above five properties, privacy preservation and request verification should also be preserved to overcome privacy problem and fooling attack, respectively. Thus, details of seven essential properties are listed as follows: (1 
Preliminaries
The basic definition and related mathematics of bilinear pairings are briefly described in this section. Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of the same large prime order q. G 1 
Review of Hu-Huang scheme
We review Hu-Huang scheme in this section. There are three entities in this scheme: an original signer, a proxy signer, and PKG (private key generator center). PKG is responsible for generating original/proxy signer private key and public key pairs. There are four phases in Hu-Huang's scheme: initialization, key pair generation, proxy key generation, and proxy signature generation and verification. The details are as follows:
In this phase, PKG selects system parameters and a master key as follows.
Step 1. PKG selects q, G 1 , G 2 , e, and P as defined in the previous section, where P is the generator of G 1 . 
Proxy key generation phase
As shown in Figure 1 , when an original signer wants to delegate his signing capacity to a proxy signer, the original signer first generates and publishes a warrant W by using Hess's ID-based signature scheme [9] . Then, PKG generates the proxy key S w . The details are as follows:
Step 
Review of Park et al.'s scheme
To overcome the drawback of Hu-Huang' scheme, Park et al. proposed an improvement. In their improvement, there exist three entities: an original signer, a proxy signer, and PKG. There are also four phases in Park et al.'s proxy signature scheme: initialization, key pair generation, proxy key generation, and proxy signature generation and verification. Because initialization, key pair generation, and proxy signature generation and verification phases are the same as those in Hu-Huang scheme, only proxy key generation phase is reviewed.
As shown in Figure 2 , when an original signer wants to delegate his signing capacity to a proxy signer, the original signer first generates a warrant W. With the proxy signer's agreement, PKG generates the proxy key S w . The details are as follows:
Proxy key generation phase
Flaws of Park et al.'s scheme
After thorough investigation, it is found that there are two flaws in Park et al.'s scheme. First, the designated proxy signer cannot make sure whether the delegation request is indeed sent from the original signer indicated in the warrant. Therefore, he may be fooled and execute some computation operations until the verification of the proxy key fails. Via this fooling attack, if no auditing mechanism is employed, the malicious user will never be detected. This fooling attack is shown in Figure 3, Via the above fooling attack, the designated proxy signer will believe that the original signer who sends the delegation request owns an identity ID o ƍ instead of ID o . Only PKG knows who the real original signer is. If no auditing mechanism is employed, the malicious user will never be detected.
Except the first fooling attack, Park et al.'s scheme has one fatal flaw. Actually, their scheme cannot work accurately because the verification of e(S w ƍ, P)=e(H 2 (W), P pub ) will never hold because e(S w c, P) = e(S 2 +S p , P) = e(S w +S p +S p , P) = e(tQ w +2tQ p , P) = e(tH 1 (W)+2tH 1 (ID P ), P) = e(H 1 (W)+2H 1 (ID P ), tP) = e(H 1 (W)+2H 1 (ID P ), P pub ) e(H 2 (W), P pub ).
The proposed scheme
In this section, an enhancement will be proposed. Different from the previous two schemes, a secure channel exists between PKG and signers for delivering public/private key pairs. In the proposed scheme, the content of an warrant is defined to contain ID o , ID p , types of messages to be signed, the valid delegation period, the delegation time stamp T, and the original signer's signature for the above data. In the proposed scheme, a delegated proxy signer can ensure that a delegation request is sent from the original signer mentioned in the warrant. There are four phases in our scheme: initialization, key pair generation, proxy key generation, and proxy signature generation and verification. Because initialization, key pair generation, and proxy signature generation and verification phases are the same as those in Hu-Huang scheme, we introduce the proposed proxy key generation phase only.
The proposed proxy key generation phase
After key pair generation phase, an original signer and a proxy signer have (Q o , S o ) and (Q p , S p ), respectively. When the original signer wants to delegate his signing capacity to a proxy signer, he needs to create a warrant and send a delegation request to the designated proxy signer. After the request is verified, PKG will help the proxy signer to generate a proxy key. This phase is shown in Figure 4 , and the details are as follows:
Security analyses
In this section, seven properties, strong unforgeability, verifiability, strong identifiability, strong undeniability, prevention of misuse, privacy preservation and request verification, are first demonstrated to analyze the security of the proposed scheme. At last, the property, correctness, is demonstrated to show the proposed scheme can work accurately. The details are as follows:
Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature for the original signer while unauthorized parties including the original signer cannot generate a valid proxy signature.
Proof: In the proposed proxy key generation phase, PKG computes Q w =H 1 (W), S w =tQ w , and S 2 =S w +S p , and sends S 2 to the designated proxy signer. After receiving S 2 , the designated proxy signer computes S w ƍ= S 2 -S p and checks if e(S w ƍ, P)=e(H 1 (W), P pub ). If it holds, he accepts S w ƍ and keeps S w ƍ as a proxy key. By this approach, only the designated proxy signer can retrieve S w ƍ with his own private key S p . Because only the designated proxy signer has S p , it denotes that only the designate proxy signer can obtain S w ƍ. Thus, no one except the designated proxy signer can generate a valid key pair under the name of the proxy signer, and strong unforgeability is ensured in the proposed scheme.
Verifiability: While verifying a proxy signature, a verifier can be convinced that a proxy signature of one message is generated under the original signer's authorization.
Proof: In the proposed proxy key generation phase, the original signer creates a warrant W, where W=(W 1 W 2 ) .W 1 includes ID o , ID p , type, period, and the delegation time stamp T, where type is types of messages to be signed and period is the valid delegation period. W 2 = (U V), where r ‫א‬ Z q *, U=rQ o , h=H 2 (W 1 , U), and V=(r+h)S o . This denotes that the original signer has generated a signature W 2 for delegation information W 1 . Thus, a warrant W is composed of delegation information and the corresponding signature. Thereupon, PKG computes Q w =H 1 (W), S w =tQ w , and S 2 =S w +S p and sends S 2 to the designated proxy signer. S w is a proxy key while Q w is its corresponding public key. As a result, when a verifier verifies a proxy signature with Q w , the original signer cannot deny his delegation. Verifiability is ensured.
Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the designated proxy signer's identity from a proxy signature.
Proof: In proxy signature generation and verification phase, when the proxy signer wants to sign the message m, he first chooses a random number r ‫א‬ Z q * and computes U=rQ w , h=H 2 Strong undeniability: If a proxy signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, the proxy signer cannot repudiate his proxy signature generation.
Proof: As mentioned above, only the designated proxy signer can retrieve S w ƍ with his own private key S p . Because only the designated proxy signer has S p , it denotes that only the designate proxy signer can obtain S w ƍ. Thus, no one except the designated proxy signer can generate a valid key pair under the name of the proxy signer. Consequently, only the proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature with S w ƍ because only he knows S w ƍ. As a result, strong undeniability is ensured in the proposed scheme.
Prevention of misuse: The proxy key pair cannot be used for other purpose. The responsibility of a proxy signer should be determined explicitly.
Proof Privacy preservation: The designated proxy signer's private key will be used for generating a proxy key pair only when he agrees to accept the delegation.
Proof: In the proposed proxy key generation phase, the proxy signer computes S 1 This verification approach ensures (1) the request is indeed sent from the original signer and (2) the proxy signer indeed agrees to accept the delegation. It is because both the original signer and the proxy signer's private keys are involved for verification. Thus, privacy preservation is ensured in the proposed scheme.
Request verification: A designated proxy signer can verify the delegation request when receiving it.
Proof: In the proposed proxy key generation phase, after receiving {W, S 1 }, the proxy signer checks if to the designated proxy signer. The designated proxy signer computes S w ƍ= S 2 -S p and checks if e(S w ƍ, P)=e(H 1 (W), P pub ). Because e(S w ƍ, P) = e(S 2 -S p , P) = e(S w +S p -S p , P) = e(S w ƍ, P) = e(tQ w , P) = e(Q w , tP) = e(Q w , P pub )=e(H 1 (W), P pub ). That is, if S 2 is indeed computed by PKG according to the delegation request, the designated proxy signer can obtain S w ƍ as a proxy key successfully. Thus, correctness is ensured.
Conclusions
Hu and Huang employed bilinear pairings to propose an identity-based proxy signature scheme. First, a designated proxy signer may be fooled. Second, the verification of the proxy key in Park et al.'s scheme will never succeed. To preserve advantages and overcome drawbacks, we have proposed an enhancement. This improvement enables the designated proxy signer to verify if the delegation request is indeed sent from the original signer indicated in a warrant. Thus, the proxy signer will not be fooled to execute lots computation operations. Though the computation load is heavier than that of Park et al.'s scheme, it is necessary to ensure the security of the proposed scheme because such approaches are widely used in many existing protocols such as EAP-LS, EAP-LLS and PEAP for WiFi and https for secure web access. We have shown the proposed scheme achieves the seven essential properties: (1) strong unforgeability, (2) verifiability, (3) strong identifiability, (4) strong undeniability, (5) prevention of misuse, (6) privacy preservation, and (7) request verification. Moreover, the proposed scheme can work accurately according to the property, correctness. Thus, this improvement preserves advantages of Park et al.'s scheme and overcomes its drawbacks. By the possessed advantages, the proposed scheme can be used in environments of limited bandwidth.
